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MARINE MINERAL RESOURCES:
NATIONAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL JURISDICTION
Robert A. Frosch
Introduction The various leaflets and
letters announcing this Symposium have
listed "Matters of Military Concern" as
the topic of my address. Considering the
far-reaching complexities involved with
the oceans' resources today and at the
same time, the vastness of the military's
oceanic interests, and responsibilities, I
think it is important that wc word the
topic with I,rrellter precision to r('ad
"l\latlers of l\lilitllry Concern Connected
with 1\1arine l\'lineral Rcsources."
The scope and nature of civil activitics in the oceans and on the seabeds is
increasing rapidly, and current technological developments indicate that exploitative activities on and beyond the
continental shelves wiII continue to
grow in both magnitude and variety.
Such growth will logically result in
various typ('s of physie;11 plants for
exlraelh'e or proec'ssing pnrl'0~e:l, lran~
portlltiun lind life support systems,
power generation plants and otlwr
appurtc'\Hllle('s of marine mineral bulustrial activity.
At the same time, international political interest in the oceans and seabeds
has heen aroused in recent years by the
1958 and 1960 United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea, by the
growing international exploitation of
fisheries, by the seaward steps of the
petroleum industry, and by growing

interest in the exploitation of marine
mineral resources. This is also demonstrated in part by the current activities
of the Unitecl Nations' .. I d lIoc COIIImillee on the Seaheel:;, and hy suggestions frolll various quarters, hoth at
home and abroad, to the effect that
man is churning the oceans into legal
chaos, and consl'quently sweeping new
international legal action is required to
define a law of the seabed. We can
expect this interest to increase rather
than diminish in the future.
Uoth the technological and the political developments relating to marine
mineral resources are of professional
concern to the military: the first, because they will give rise to a new order
of militllry requirements along with nell'
problellls of lICcollllllodation bc1ween
militarv and other uscs; the second,
hecaus~ they have the potential for
changing the traditional nature of the
freedom of the seas, and, in so doillg,
would have major implications for military aspects of the Nation's security.
Accordingly, I would like to address
three topics: (1) requirements for military capability arising in connection
with the exploitation of the mincral
resources of the world ocean; (2) problems of accommodation between military and nonmilitary uses arising from
the exploitation; and (3) problems in
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legal regimcs (including arms control
n'p:inl<'~) trip:g('rcd (at least in part) hy
tht' prohlt'lII~ iIIltl pro~peets of exploitation. In di~l'u~:;inp: thl~SI' SUhjl'l·t~ I will
considl'r them from thc point of v.icw of
onc responsiule for military uscs of the
oceans and of military security, giving at
hm;t only pa~ing nol iel~ to olher a~pl'd~
of overall national security, of which
military security is only one ingredient.
l\lany other aspects of these problems
are being covered elsewhere in this
Symposium.
This is an exceedingly complex suuject, and many diverse views are being
considered. The statements made in this
papcr should be considered as my
thoughts on the subject and should not
necessarily be interpreted as represClIting official governmental positions.
Military Uses and Responsibilities ill
thc Oceans. A~ a foundation for Illy
discussion, I will describe some of the
principal aspects of the involvement of
the military with the sea.
l\lany military USI~S of the ocean stem
from gencral uses of the occan: Where
man goes his prohlcms go, where man's
problems go his conflicts go, and where
man's conflicts go his military forces
follow. I note parenthetically that it
sometimes seems to be implicitly assumed that removal of the military
forces somehow removes the conflicts
and thc prohlems. hilt I ~ee no n'ason to
helieve this. except in the occasional
case where the prest:nee of the military
force makes the problem or thc conflict.
In any case we may call this the first
dass of military IISI'S of tht: Ol!t:i1ns;
H(; eneral usc of the oceans."
A second class of military uses of the
ocean stem from special properties of
the ocean, including the fact that there
is no sovereignty there, the fact that the
sea provides special kinds of concealment, and the fact that it is an arena
gcncrally cmpty of human population
concentrations.

A third class of military uses stems
from uses generated in response to the
military uses called out hy the first two
l'laS$I'S. mltl hy those in thc third class.
(I fold the third dass into it~df to avoid
a useless scqucnce.)
Within these categories lies a wide
range of present and possible future
military activities, most of which can be
influenced by changes in national or
international views of jurisdiction, or by
access to and use of the ocean floors
and seabeds; changes that could result
from international political action relatcd primarily to the world's marine
mineral resources.
Included in the phrase "general use
of the oceans" are the traditional, timehonored uses of the world's oceans to
move military forces to or against
foreign shores and to prevent such
movements against our own shores.
General use includes the protection of
U.S. shipping, fishing, and other property at sea; it includes the entire spectrum of naval activity--surface, subsurface and in the air above the seas.
Such use is the essence of naval power;
if we are not careful in how we tamper
with the factors that permit it we may
harm our national interest.
In the second category,--"military
uses generated by special properties of
the oceans, "--we include those uses
which take advantage of the mobility
and concealment made possible by the
marine environment. The flexible and
highly invulnerable POLARIS deterrence systcm is a prime example of such
use, as the follow-on POSEIDON system
will he.
The third category,--"military uses
generated by other military and by civil
uses, "--includes such activities as antisubmarine warfare; air defense of fleets,
forces, and merchant shipping; submarine warfare, mine warfare; search,
rescue, and salvagc mIssIons; and
oceanographic forecasting. Within this
category, there are several possible mili-
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tary uses of the continental shelves and
seabeds. Saturation diving techniques,
for example, together with future submersihles, sensors and tools may permit
!,'Teatl'r military lise of the oeean floor.
!-\ul'h use could well he (hreatcl}(~d or
limited by changes in the legal regime
for the deep oceans.
Requirements Arising from Exploitation. As the Nations's civil activities in
the oceans and on the seabeds increase,
the Navy can expect a considerable
increase in tasks and requirements. At
present, for example, a worldwitie civil
and military salvage network is in operation under Navy management and control.
By law (PL-513 of the 80th Congress
and 10 U.S. Code 7361, et. seq.) and
policy (OPNA VINST 4740.2B), while
the Navy does not commit itself to
maintain salvage facilities in excess of
Navy requirements, the Secretary of the
Navy can and does provide necessary
salvage facilities for public and private
vessels upon suitable terms. In effect,
the Navy is thc principal salvage agcncy
of the federal government, working with
Navy vessels and contract services to fill
gaps in normal commercial salvage capabilities where necessary. This work is
carried out, worldwide, by the Supervisor of Salvage working under the
Naval Ship Systems Command. In addition, the Navy assists the Coast Guard in
carrying out its statutory responsibility
for thc safety of life and property at sea
by providing additional men mill ships
when required. In fact, the Navy participates in the traditional law of the sea:
give help where help is necded.
The !,'Towing numhers of rcsearch
ships, submcrsibles, and divers; and
recreational craft, submersibles, and
divers; operating from the nearshore to
the deep ocean environment will inevitably require more rescue and salvage
operations. For example, as more and
more divers expcriment in the months
and years to come with saturated diving,

there may be an increased need for
man-rated hyperbaric facilitics just to
handle cmcrgencies resulting from such
diving. Also, we can expect that increasing rcquirements for rcscue of pcr:;ollnl'l and ~alvn~l~ of n"l(prial will III'
tire inevitable re:mlts of growth in the
fishing and maritime industries. The
possible necessity and possibility of
expanding the Navy's salvage network
and increasing its capabilities to deal
with such growing requirements is certainly worthy of the most serious consideration.
In this connection, there is a growing
requirement for safety certification of
commercial and recreational submersibles. The Coast Guard has the
responsibility for general certification
and for the definition of standards of
safety, etc., but because the Navy has
the greatest capability in the federal
government in the technology of suhmersibles, we are working with thc
Coast Guard both in the initial stages of
standards preparation, and to assist
them in acquiring the necessary skills
and capabilities to carry on the work
themselves in the long term. I think it
worth mentioning at this point that
there is a long\ tradition of cooperation
hetween Navy and Coast Guard in carrying out our respective peacetime missions, in addition, of course, to our
close association in wartime.
Navy certification of commercial or
private submersibles is only in connection with their use by the Navy or its
personnel.
As mineral exploration and exploiLation activities (be they for sulphur,
petroleum products, or heavy metals)
incrcase and extend seaward, associated
prohlems will increase, not only for
rescue and salvage work, hut also for
protection and policing of U.S.
nationals carrying out commercial activities on the surface, in the water
column, and on the seabed.
While the United States, of course,
looks first to diplomatic or pcaceful
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legal resolution of any problem of thc
protection of its citizcns, when engaged
in lawful activity on the high scas
against arbitrary intcrference by other
powers, or by piracy, this has to be
backed up by a military pott·ntial. Thi~
requirelllcnt lIIay be (~xpeeted to extend
to similar lawful activity in the water
column or on the seabed. Such protection would, again, presumably be a
responsibility shared between Navy and
Coast Guard, depending somewhat on
the naturc and location of the problem.
Clearly we will need the military capability to operate everywhere technology
permits exploitation, if we are to fulfill
this requirement
Thcsc new and increasing challenges
relating to marine mineral resources
activities are functions for which the
Navy and Coast Guard will accept responsihility as part of their overall
missions. We should remcmber, howevcr, that they arc requirements that
may demand an expanded effort on the
part of the Navy and Coast Guard in
terms of manpowcr, operating forces,
shorc facilities, and funding.
Problems of Accommodation. Another factor of interest to the military,
stemming from marine technological
development, will be the effect, in terms
of interference or hazards, that the
growing number of offshore and deep
occan platforms, structures, ships and
related activities have on military operations in the marine environment. Thc
Navy, for cxamplc, will have to be more
and morc on guard against physical
interferenec from moving objects; in
turn, it will have to bc continuously
aware of lo(:ations at which tIH:r!~ am
on·going marine resource exploitation
activities. A partial list of expanding
aeLivitit:s posing interference prohlellls
would include fishing, petroleum exploration, drilling, petrolcum production operations, salvage work, recreational boating, merchant traffic, and
oceanographic surveys being conductcd

by means of ships, buoys, frec submersibles, towed submersibles, tethered submersibles, seabed vchicles, and seabed
installations.
A recent review of the situalion
i,ulieales thal naval operations involving
individual ship (:xcreises have been lIIo~l
affected by (amI presumably have most
affected) nonmilitary oceanic activities
which havc included fishing, merchant
traffic, recreational boating, and ocean
survey operations. To a lesser dcgree,
amphibious, gunnery, and rcplenishment operations, antisubmarine warfare
exerciscs, and air-sea rescue operations
have been affected by the same kinds of
interference. Minesweeping and mine
hunting experimental work and exercises have experienced interference from
recreational boating, fishing activities,
oil drilling operations, and the establishment of artificial reefs.
While nonmilitary interferenccs have
increased in recent years, they have not,
by-and-large, created serious problems
for the Navy, and we hope that naval
operations have not created serious
problcms for others. In the great majority of reported interference incidents,
the Navy ships involved have either
accommqdated or adjusted to thc nonmilitary activity. The Navy has, for
example, modified operations sufficiently to permit their completion
with minimum interruption; in many
cases it has solved the interference
problem by giving morc sca room to thc
nonmilitary activity. It has largely accommodatcd the oil industry in this
fashion by moving seaward and away
from interaction with drilling and production operations.
The Navy is a firm believer in the
concept of accommodation of many
different users, a concept which is, of
course, fundamental to the present law
of the sea. For example, the Convention
on the Continental Shelf authorizes
coastal nations to erect installations on
their shelves to explore and exploit
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seabed and subsoil resources, but at the
same time, stipulates that this exercise
of authority must not result in any
unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing, or conservation of living
resources. The Gulf of Mexico offers an
excellent example of the successful
application of this concept in an area of
high-intensity marine activity.
In sum, while thi:; "crowding" of the
oceans is of concern to the military, it
does not pose an insurmountable problem. As we have for many decades,
suitable arrangements will be made for
multiple users using the historic principle of the international law of the sea
as codified in Article 2 of the 1958
Geneva Convention on Law of the Sea.
One further point to keep in mind.
however, is that it is not necessarily easy
to move a military use of an area. The
costs may be high, perhaps so high as to
be prohibitive, particularly when extensive on and offshore facilities such as
ranges are involved. This suggests the
need for careful long-range planning by
all potential users of an ocean area so
that future conflict may be minimized.
Problems Arising from Possible
Legal Regimes. Present-day naval operations are conducted in an international
legal regime in which the principle of
freedom of the high seas prevails: All
nations have an equal right to use the
high seas, one nation may not unreasonably interfere with the lawful use
of the hi~h seas by another. and each
nation has jurisdiction over activities
conducted on the high seas under its
flag or nationality.
Under the present regime, national
jurisdiction over ex pi oration and ex ploitation of the seabed is limited to a
relatively narrow offshore area adjacent
to the coastal nation and short of the
deep ocean seabed. In general terms, the
law of capture applies to marine mineral
resources, with title to the resources
vesting only once they have been
dredged, mined, or otherwise removed.

The explorer and exploiter are both
protected and limited by the requirement that each user have reasonable
regard for the activities of other users.
The user's nation can control his marine
operations.
Changes to the intcrnationnl Inw of
the sea will undoubtedly be required, as
changes have been required and made in
the past. In all likelihood, it wiII be
essential, for example, for nations to
agree on a precise outer limit for the
extension of national jurisdiction under
the regime of the continental shelf.
Nations may also ultimately need to
resolve eonfliet-of-use problems on the
seabed and suhsoil of the deep oceans.
As indicated by my earlier eomll1ents,
the problem of such conflicting use on
the high seas is not a new problem. In
the past, as specific problems have
arisen, specific solutions under international law have been devised to providc
for an accommodation of interests.
Lying behind these specific rulcs is the
general rule of international law that
one use of the high seas may not
unreasonably interfere with other lawful
uses.
Any number of suggested new
regimes for tQe world's seabeds, thcir
exploitation, And their ownership are
being advanced, most involving either
greater restrictions or greater international involvement than does the present regime.
Under the terms of a Flag State
Regime, for example, a nation would
have exclusive jurisdiction over a vessel
flying its flag, and it would have responsibility with regard to what those
individuals operating under its nng
coulll lawfully do in light of th(~ rip:hts
of other nations. The nation of the
marine minerals explorer or exploih~r
would have a protective interest in the
resources to be exploited within a reasonable area, although national sovereignty over areas of the deep ocean
seabed would be prohibited.
The Median Line Regime would have
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the coastal nations divide the entirc
oceans, seabeds and subsoil among them
on the basis of median lines equidistant
from the nearest land. In its ocean area,
the shorc statc would control right of
access. prescription, and appropriation.
A Itcrna tively, the Inh'rnalional
Hcgistry proposnl would have the establishment of an Intcrnational Registry
Agency which would, for a fcc, registcr
flag state claims. The agency would
presumably exercise some authority,
rcgarding competing claims, thus validating certain flag state claims.
Going one step further, the proposed
rCl,rime of a Limited International Authority would cstablish an international
agcncy with limited rights to Icase the
seabed and prescribe regulations, but no
general ownership rights.
Finally, a rehrime of Complcte Internationalization would include the establishment of an international agcncy
which would own the seabed, tht- suhsoil, and their resources with authority
analogous to sovereignty over marine
mineral resources.
I would like now to point out another interim approach toward clarification of principles related to different
seabed users. I refer to the Seabed
Principles introduced by the United
States at last month's meeting of the
U.N. Ad Hoc Committee. From the
military viewpoint, these principles,
intended to guide nations and their
nationals in the exploration and use of
the deep ocean floor and its subsoil,
offer a most useful approach to seabed
problems. They do not imply a "freeze"
on marine mineral resources exploration
and exploitation activities whilc specific
sealH:d rub; l:volvl: fWIII IIII' prndit:,: of
seabcd m;crs or arc ncgotiated in thc
uhstracL.
Anothcr aspcct of the in tcraction of
resource exploitation and military uses
involves the problem of arms control.
Mincral resources and arms control do
not nccessarily travel hand-in-hand; the
two are often linked, however, in pro-

posed new regimes for the manne environment. As any arms control agreements relating to the continental shelves
and dcep ocean floors are a matter of
critical concern to thosc rcsponsiblc for
the Nation's ~ccurit y, a brief COllllllcnt
on seabed arllls control proposals being
advanced, cithcr as part of thc proposed
seabed regimes or otherwisc, is in ordcr.
At prcsent, suhject to the provisions
of the United Nations Chartcr, there are
few restrictions on defcnsivc military
dcployment und activities in thc occuns.
Coastal stute consent is required for
tcrritorial sea, and to some cxtent continental shelf operations. Additionally,
there are the normal constraints of the
rules of war, including the Geneva Convention's, the restraint against unreasonable interference with other users,
and the limited test ban treaty which
prohibits undcrwater, atmospheric, and
space nuclcar tests. The various arllls
control proposnls which have heen discussed, might, among other things, prohibit the stationing or affixing of
nuclear weapons on the seabed, restrict
the seabeds of the world for peaceful
uses only or demiliturize thcm completely.
With regurd to these proposals, the
point I wish to make today is that
several nations already have a capability
to use the oceans and seabeds for
military purposes. This situation dictates that any international effort to
limit military uses of the continental
shelves and decp ocean floors must be
subject to truly effective controls and
measures for verification: the ascertainment of treaty violations on the part of
other nations.
General Concluding Remarks. In all
of the marine mineral activity, both
political and technological, underway
today considerable attention is being
focused on the need to be able to
distinguish more clearly between the
continental shelf and the deep occan
bed. It is significant to note that this
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distinction is not of great importance to
the military as it views the proposed
regimes for seabed mineral exploitation
and arms control. The military seldom
has need to make such a distinction in
its ol'canic opcrations, being concerned,
in~Lt'ad, with tlH' \'xll'nL of naLional
jllri~dit'lion Lhat is Lhc Im'adlh of Lhl'
h'rriLorial sea. The Navy is concerned,
howcver, that proposcd seabcd regimes
might eventually 1I'~ult in claims and
restrictions on the use of the superjacent waters and secondly might lead
to information and reporting requirements that would pose unnecessary
problems for military operations. While
the Navy is free to operate on the high
seas, and while it generally has the right
of innocent passage through foreign
territorial waters, it must gain the consent of the coastal state if it wishes to
operate in foreign territorial waters.
The military view has been, and
continues to be, that any extension of
territorial seas should be kept to a
minimum, sovereignty over the continental shelves (whatever their seaward
boundary) should be closely limited,
and the air space above the high seas
should remain free.
The security of the United States
rests in part on the Navy's use of the
high seas, and we would like to see the
use and legal coverage of the high seas
develop in such a way as not to impede
this portion of our security unnecessarily. The military has neither the

desire nor the intention to impede the
full development of marine mineral resources. Rather we see fuller exploitation as a natural and positive development, but one which wiII require new
capabilities for policing and protection
and thus poses new military problems.
We hope that the development of the
requisite law will proceed together with
the development of exploitation and its
technology so that the law wiII not
impede the development nor channel it
in directions that later turn out to be
unwise or difficult to protect or police.
I reemphasize the view that with the
gradual evolution of specific rules based
on practice it should be possible successfully to accommodate traditional uses
(including military uses) of thc sea with
future exploitation of the seabed.
I might add that the Navy has another interest regarding marine mineral
exploration and exploitation activities:
that is, within the limits of national
security, to make available from its
ocean engineering program all the technological and scientific information
possible for use by marine mineral
explorers and exploiters, information
ranging from bathymetric data to the
technical information required for submarines and submersibles. The Navy is
most anxious to cooperate with the
whole public and private community in
developing a national program for the
oceans with the objective of enhancing
national security in its largest sense.
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